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FACTORS IMPEDING CREDIT USE IN 
SMALL-FARM HOUSEHOLDS IN BOLIVIA* 
Introduction 
Agricultural credit is considered an important instrument in helping 
small farmers .to increase their income and numerous programs have been 
established to increase the volume of agricultural credit for this purpose 
in low-income countries. Yet, despite these efforts, few small farmers 
are integrated into these formal market credit programs, and do not use 
credit or, if they do, they continue to borrow from informal credit market 
lenders (Adams). Reasons commonly offered are: (a) farmers have sufficient 
liquidity given their planned expenditures; (b) after taking account of 
available technology and risk, farmers do not judge the expected returns 
high enough to warrant borrowing; .Cc) farmers lack information about the 
avai!ability of credit and find the cost of obtaining that information is 
too high; and (d) farners are discouraged from borrowing because of high 
transactions costs involved in obtaining a loan. (Baker, Bhatt, Lip.ton, 
Schultz). The latter helps explain why small farmers prefer to deal with 
informal market lenders whose simple and low-cost credit delivery systems 
more than offset higher interest costs (Donald) • 
. In order to try to increase credit use most empirical research and 
policy =easures have focused on demand related factors that would increase 
the prccuctivity of credit and raise farm incomes. It is only recently. 
e that i:i.::reasing attention has been directed at factors on the supply side, 
especially the transactions costs of credit use, as serious deterants to 
borrmdr.g (Adans and ::;ehI:lan) with the call for cost-reducing policy 
innovations in agricultural lending (Adams and Ladman). The objective of 
the present study is to identify both supply and demand factors that affect: 
borrowing by farm households. Survey data from a large sample of small 
farmers in traditional farming areas in the mountain valley regions of 
southern Bolivia provide the basis to empirically examine the roles of 
these factors. In the following, a conceptual framework of farmer detnand 
and supply of credit is presented, and hypothesized factors that would limit 
farmer use of credit are identified. Then, descriminate and tabular analyses 
are applied to a sample of Bolivian small farmers to determine if there 
are differences between users, potential users and non-potential users of 
credit as well as between formal and informal market borrowers with respect 
to the hypothesized inhibiting factors. 
Conceptual Framework 
An excess-demanq-f or-funds model is used to explain the quantity of 
credit demanded by a farm household, where the farmer uses funds to satisfy 
both production and consumption requirements. In this model the farmer's 
demand for credit is the residual or excess demand of the farm household's 
demand for funds over the supply of internal funds that are available in the 
household. 
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
As sho:wn in Figure 1, the marginal value product (MVP) schedule is the 
farm-househbld's demand for funds, and reflects diminishing marginal utility 
for funds. The demand for borrowed funds is the portion of the schedule to 
the right of the supply of internal funds (S). The cost' of credit are repre-
sented by the average (AC) and I!larginal (HC) cost schedules. Fixed transactions e 
costs, such as filling out forms, obtaining necessary documents, paying 
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required fees, trips to lenders office, etc. mean that the AC of the initial 
units of credit are relatively high, but decline rapidly as more funds are 
borrowed. 
MC is comprised of three elements: interest rate (i), marginal transactions 
costs (MTC), and marginal risk costs (R). Although a lender usually charges 
a fixed rate of interest, when the borrower is forced to seek out additional 
sources of credit both i and MTC rise. Moreover, as more is borrowed, the 
farmer faces increasing R not only from the possible losses of his equity as 
he expands his leverage but also as he diminshes his credit reserve. 
A farm household will not want to borrow if the expected AC are greater 
than expected average returns. QA is the borrowing threshold and the farmer 
would be willing to borrow up to QB where MC equals MVP. Thus, QSQB funds 
would be borrowed and 0 Q5 would be supplied from the farmers internal funds. 
The components of the model - the demand schedule for funds, the supply 
of internal funds and the borrowing and risk costs - are each affected by the 
particular characteristics of a given farm household. Characteristics associ-
ated with the demand schedule for funds are educational level and management 
ability of the farmer, use of improved technology, type of farm enterprise, 
location of farm, and level of market integration, The supply of internal 
funds is affected primarily by the asset level of the household. For a given 
demand schedule for funds, a higher asset level allows for a larger supply of 
equity funds. This sup?lY is expected to increase with ~e farmer's age since 
assets are typically accumulated over time. 
The credit supply schedule faced by the farm-household is determined by 
borrowing costs that are a functio~ of interest, transactions and risk costs. 
The farwer's previous borrowing experience, educational level and language 
(in cases where native tongue is not the language in which credit and marketing 
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transactions nor.nally are undertaken) and aversion to risk affect these costs. ~ 
Additional factors include the paperwork.and time involved in obtaining a loan, 
loan size, asset level, credit use, expected income and probabilities of crop 
failure and unfavorable market prices. 
The particular household characteristics associated with each of the 
components of the excess demand for funds model jointly determine the quantity 
of credit demanded. Characteristics associated with a higher demand schedule 
for funds, a lower equity funds supply and lower borrowing costs each contribute 
toward raising the quantity of credit demanded by a farm household. 
Studv Area and Data Base 
The data used in this study were obtained from a sample of 699 small-farm 
households interviewed in the Bolivian Agricultural Sector II Loan Survey 
conducted in April and May 1977 and located in the three Southwestern Bolivian 
departments (states) of Chuquisaca, Potosi and Tarija. Data were obtained on 
many characteristics of farm households, including resource use~ production, 
income and marketing as well as details on use of credit or, in the case of 
non-users, the reasons for. non-use. 
The sample region encompassed a low-income agricultural sector comprised 
almost entirely of snall farmers, many of whom utilized traditional production 
practices. For the agricultural year studied, the mean farm size was found to 
be four hectares per household. Mean household income of the region was only 
6,500 pesos (325 U.S. dollars). In addition, 25 percent of that income was 
derived from non-cash sources such as consumption of goods produced on the farm. 
Also, off-farm income accounted for 40 percent of the net household income. 
The educational level of the sample households was uniformly low in the 
• 
region. Only 15 percent of the heads of the households had over three years e 
of formal education. Nearly half of the households used the Incan language of 
, . 
" .. 
•• 
• 
5 
Quechua, rather than Spanish as their principal language, a majority of whom 
live in the d.epartment of Potosi~ 
It was found that most of the households do not borrow. Only 6. 7 percent 
of the h>usdloids had used agricultural credit: during the agricultural year; 
3.4 and 3.3 percent used credit from formal and informal sources respectively. 
In spite of the low percentage using credit, 87 percent in~icated that they 
would like to borrow from formal sources during the next agricultural year .• 
The farm households were separated into three groups according to 
borrowing status: (a) borrowers who prrsently use credit; (b) non-potential 
borrowers, those who do not want to use credit during the next agricultural 
year; and (c) potential borrowers; those who want to use credit during the 
next agricultural year. 
Hypotheses 
Three hypotheses were tested. First, physical and psychological conditions 
associated with farm households are important as differentiating factors 
between borrowers, potential borrowers and non-potential borrowers. 
Second, farm households that use formal credit sources in comparison 
with those that use informal credit sources have: higher levels of fixed 
assets, higher levels· of income, higher levels of education and literacy, 
more proficiency in the Spanish language, closer proximity to financial insti-
tutions, different uses of credit and borrowed larger amounts of credit. 
Third, potential borrowers are impeded from .borrowing by th:e implicit costs 
of credit, including risk and the perceived transactions costs of loan 
application procedures, paperwork and distance to market. 
Multiple discriminate analysis was used to test the first hypothesis . 
Tabular analysis was used to test the second a_nd third hypotheses. 
Predeternined characteristics that would influence credit use, as deter-
mined by the conceptual framework, were utilized. These included data on the 
' ' 6 .. .(> 
farniing operations and qualitative responses by the sampled farm households on 
their reasons for using credit or not. Proxy measures were employed as neces~ 
sary. Twenty-two differentiating factors were examined; operational definitions 
for all variables used follow. 
Definition of Variables 
Education is the level of formal education obtained by the head of the 
household. The levels used are: 
1 = no education 
2 = 1-3 years 
3 = 4-12 years 
4 = more than 12 years education. 
Literacy is equal to 1 if the household head is literate, and 0 if not 
literate. 
Language is equal to 1 if the principal language spoken in the household 
is Spanish, and 0 if Quechua. 
Age is the age of the household head in years. 
Distance is a measure of the travel time from the farm to the usual 
market place. The distance levels are: 
1 = less than 1 h.our 
2 = 1-3 hours 
3 = 3-6 hours 
4 = 6 er more hours. 
Land is the usable land assets of the farm household measured in 
hectares, '"7b-ere usable land is the total land size, excluding land that cannot 
be planted, grazed or productively used. 
Land Title is equal to 1 if the household has a legal government-issued e 
title to its land, and 0 otherwise. 
) . 
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• Net Farm Income (NFL) is all net cash inc<;>m'e from the farm plus imputed values for non-cash income earned from the farm. 
Off-Farm Income (OFI) is all income earned by all household members from. 
non-farm sources. 
Net Household Income (NHI) is NFI + OFL 
Cattle is the number of head of cattle owned by the household. 
Percent Corn is the ratio of the value of corn sales to the total value of 
farm cash receipts of the household, expressed as a percentage. 
Percent Potato is the ratio of the value of potato sales to the total value 
of farm cash receipts of tne household;- expressed as a percentage. 
Market Intergration is the ratio of the farm cash receipts to the gross 
farm incom~ of the household expressed as a percentage. Gross farm income 
e includes an imputed value of the farm output consumed by the farm household. 
Operating Expenses are the total agricultural expenses. Included are 
production expenses, livestock expenses o~her than livestock purchases, wages 
paid, rents paid, maintenance expenses and other agricultural expenses. 
Investment Expenses are those expenses for purchasing livestock, tools and 
machinery, and capital improvements, such as wells, irrigation and construction. 
Improved Technology equals l if the household bought fertilizer or agri- . 
cultural cheoicals or used improved varieties of seeds or plants during the past 
crop year, and 0 otherwise. 
Loan Size is the present size of the ()utstandingloan at the time of the 
interview. 
Production Goals equals 1 if the household produces at its present level 
because ''it does not need or want to produce more" and 0 otherwise. 
Production Limitations is a set of dummy variables measuring the house-
hold's stated impediments to producing more. The limitation variables are: 
8 
Price Security = 1 if product prices and price security are stated 
·impediments, 0 otherwise, 
Markets and Services = 1 if accessibility to markets and services at 
reasonable prices is an impediment, 0 if otherwise, 
Need for more Workers = 1 if lack of labor is an impediment, 0 otherwise, 
Need for more Land = 1 if insufficient land is a stated impediment,. 0 
otherwise. 
Paoerwork is equal to 1 if paperwork is a stated impediment to the :use 
of credit by the household, and 0 otherwise. It specifically includes the 
lack of understanding of paperwork, too much paperwork and legal papers not 
being in order. 
Fear of Refusal equals 1 if fear of refusal by the lenders was a stated 
reason for not using credit, and 0 otherwise. 
Fear of Repayment equal_s 1 if fear of repayment ability from yield or 
price decline are stated impediments of using credit, and 0 otherwise. 
Empirical Results 
Differences Between Groups 
The univariate F-values presented in Table 1 indicate that significant 
differences exist among the group means for eighteen of the twenty-two 
variables hypothesized to affect the behavior of borrowers, non-borrowers 
and potential borrowers. In particular, production goals, investment expenses, 
language, price security and operating expenses, market integration and 
improved technology have extremely high F-values. The land, net farm income, 
percent corn and need for more land variables are not statistically significant 
because of large standard deviations from the mean within each group. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
The univariate F-values indicate the potential power of each individual 
• 
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variable in discriminating among groups. The relative importance of each 
characteristic is determined with discriminate functions when all variables 
are entered simultaneously into the discriminant analysis. Two discriminant 
functions are produced in Table 2. 1 The standardized discriminmt function 
coefficients show the relative contribution of each associated variable to 
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each of the functions. That the two fmc tions have "X.,2 values that are statis-
tically significant at the 0.001 level, with 38 and 18 degrees of freedom 
respectively, confirms that there are distinct differences in farm-household 
characteristics among the groups of non-potential borrowers, potential borrowers 
and present borrowers. 
The power of discrimination in the function variables is 31 percent in 
Function 1 and 17 percent in Function 2, for a total of 48 percent explained 
. . h d. . 2 
variation among t e ere it groups. Eigenvalues show that the two functions 
account for 68 and 32 percent of the model's discriminating power respectively. 
Using the discriminant functions to classify each sample household into the 
most likely borrower group according to the set of characteristics associated 
with that household, the discriminant functions correctly classified 78 percent 
3 
of all the sample households. 
As denoted by the location of group centroids, Function 1 primarily 
distinguishes the non-potential borrower group from the other groups. This 
is shown by the relatively large size (-1.584) of the group centroid in 
relation to the other group centroids, which <re 0. 221 for potential and 
-0. 282 for the present borro,vers. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
In Function 1 production goals (coefficient of -0.816) contributes 33 
percent of the total discrimnatory powers and an additional 31 percent is 
provided by the need for more workers (-0.282), price security (-Q.244) and 
. 1Q 
language (-0.227). Other factors contribute considerably less and, consequently,. 
are much less important in differentiating groups. The negative signs of the 
leading variables indicate that these factors contribute to the non-potential 
use of credit whereas a positive sign would indicate a contribution to potential 
credit use. 
Discriminant Function 2 most readily distinguishes present borrowers from 
the other groups. The leading -..ariables are investment expenses (-0.519), 
price security (-0.378), operating expenses (-0.284), cattle (-0.244), improved 
technology (-0.237), land (-0.226) and market integration (-0.159). These 
coefficients confirm that borrowers have considerably higher levels of market 
activity than nonborrowing. 
The coefficients of the two functions have the expected signs for all 
variables with the exceptions of distance, land and net household income. It 
would be expected that in Function 2 the distance coefficient would have a 
positive sign, i.e. households not wanting credit would live farthest from 
the marketplaces due to high costs of obtaining information and transactions. 
However, the result is plau~ible because off-farm income constitutes the 
majority of the net income for households closer to the market and, therefore 
these farmers are relatively less dependent on farming as a livelihood. As 
shown in Table 1, land and net household income have the expected relafive mean 
differences among the borrower groups, but the signs on the function coeffi-
cients are not consistent--probably due to the large variation that exists for . 
these variables as evidenced by their low univariate F-values. 
The results demonstrate that there are distinct differences in farm-
household characteristics among groups of non-potential borrowers, potential 
borrowers and present borrowers. The major characteristics distinguishing 
non-potential borrowers from other farm households are that they are less 
eager to expand production and have a more frequent production constraint due 
• 
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to lack of workers than the borrowers and potential borrowers. Non-potential 
borrowers are also older, less well educated, use less improved technology 
and live closer to marketplaces than the other groups. 
Potential borrowers constitute the majority of the sample households. 
The results show that this group of households are distinguished by being 
much more apt to speak Quechua, living farther from the marketplaces, having 
fewer cattle, and by being much less hindered in production by concern for 
price security than the other households. Borrowers are most distinguished by 
having very high investment and operating expenses, a concern for price 
security, more cattle, a high use of technology, more market integration, and 
higher levels of education in comparison to other groups. 
Formal and Informal Market Borrowers 
Tabular analysis was usea to determine if there were differences in 
selected characteristics between farmers borrowing in formal and informal 
credit markets. The results are presented in Table 3. 
(Insert Table 3) 
It is clear that formal market borrowers, in comparison to informal 
market borrowers, live cloEEr to the market centers, have higher levels of 
farm income, obtain larger loans and use credit more often for fertilizer, 
chemicals and seed. There is no significant difference in their level of 
education, household language, cultivable land, nor off-farm income. 
Implicit Costs of Credit 
In answer to the multiple response question of which factors inhibited 
their use of credit the sampled farmers had three predominent responses; 80 
percent identified "excessive paperwork", 37 percent stated that they feared 
they would not be· able to repay the loan, and 20 percent stated they they 
feared they would be refused the loan. Actual refusal from lending institutions 
12 i. 
was not a major impediment since only six percent of the households had • 
prev:i,ously sought funds from formal lenders. In terms of the conceptual 
framework, relative. to expected returns, .the first response implies excessive 
transactions costs and the sec.end excessive risk costs. The thi~d response 
is suggestive of losing face and,6r losing the sunk fixed transactions costs 
involved in obtaining a loan. 
Tabular analysis was employed to compare each of the household characteristics 
of those households that had responded with any of the three factors with 
those households that did not indicate that response. Table 4 presents the 
significant summary statistics of a breakdown of these major credit use 
impediments. 
(Inse!t Table 4) 
The households impeded by paperwork are shown to be younger, less 
educated, more likely to speak Quechua, live farther from the market, and have 
less land and incone. Households impeded by fear of inability' to repay loans 
have less educatio:-i, less· land and live farther from the marke·t-_ Those impeded 
by fear of loan refusal have less land, live farther from the market and are 
more likely to Speak Quechua. 
Conclusions 
Even though few small-farm households in Southern Bolivia were using. 
credit, most wanted to use credit from formql market institutions. This 
suggests that there are both demand factors, influencing the expected productivity 
of credit, and/or supply factors, influencing the availability and cost of 
credit, that impede their use of credit. Tests of hypotheses that there are 
differences between borrowers, potential borrowers and non-potential borrowers; 
differences between formal and informal market borrowers; and that imJ)licit 
costs discourage borrowing; identify the importance of these factors and provide 
• 
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insight for policy makers designing small-farmer credit programs.not only in 
Bolivia, but also in other countries. 
As expected, borrowet:"s tended to use higher levels of technology, and 
have more ambitious production goals,,higher levels of :(nvestment, higher 
operating expenses, higher household incomes, more cattle, more education, anc\ 
greater market integration than non-borrowers. Undoubtedly, some of these 
characteristics are the result of using credit, but they also indicate that 
these farmers were able to perceive the benefits of credit as exceeding the 
costs of credit, perhaps due to their higher level of education and market 
intergration. 
Borrowers in the formal market tend to live closer to the market, have 
higher net farm and household incomes, obtain larger loans and use credit for 
technologically improved inputs than informal market borrowers. There is no 
significant dif ferenc.e ·in their level of education, household language, µsable 
land size, nor off-farm income. 
·These results suggest that formal market borrowers use higher levels of 
technology that require larger loans and lead to higher incomes. Thus, they 
exceed the formal borrowing threshold where returns cover average costs of 
credit even though the initial borrowing costs are likely to be much higher 
than in the informal market. Their closer proximity to market centers suggests 
. 
that they experience lower transactions costs. for travel and time spent in 
route and!i.ave lo,..;er costs in obtaining informat.ion about formal market lenders • 
. The non-significance of education, language, off-farm income and useable land 
size· rule out these characteristics as differentiating characteristics and further 
demostr ate that the perceived costs and expected benefits from the use of credit 
• are major factors that cause the borrower to use formal or informal market 
sources. The lower income households who lived farther· from marke.t and dernarided 
smaller quantities of credit had perceived less costs involved with obtaining 
funds from informal lenders due to the lo-.;er initial transaction costs. 
Non-potential borrowers were distinguished by their lack of production 
goals, their greater age, lower levels of education, use of low <:?r levels of 
technology and shortage of labor compared to borrowers and potential borrowers. 
These factors suggest that they do not perceive the benefits of credit to 
exceed the costs of same. Tney also tended to live more proximate to the 
market than potential borrowers. This may explain their higher off-farm incomes 
than the. potential borrowers who tended to live more distant from the market. 
Potential .borrot..'ers, who co:iprised a large proportion of the s atll>le, were likely 
to speak Quechua as their principal language, also perhaps a function of 
distance from markets, but this did not inhibit them from wanting to borrow as 
evidenced by their ambitious production goals and relative less hinderence by 
price insecurity than other_ groups. Labor was not a production impediment 
which implies that many households are not presently able to fully utilize their 
labor force. 
These results suggest that farmers who want credit are not principally 
impecied by factors on the demand side, indeed they perceive the 'linkages 
between credit, acess. to technology and improved incomes. Rather it is the 
farm households' supply factors that limit their credit. Clearly distance 
from market not only tends to limit the availability of credit, especially 
from formal market institutions, because of the incre;1.fX!d. lender costs in 
servicing more-distant far::.ers, but al~w raises borr o~r transactions costs. 
·The fact that a large majority of farmers ind~cated that the excessive paper-
work was a principal factor impeding the use of credit from formal market 
sources suggests that farr::ers perceive· these transactions costs to be excessive 
1.4 
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to warrant borrowing. It is. significant that this response was highly associated 
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• with younger, less-well educated.Quechua-speaking farmers, who live distant 
from·the market and have less land and income. Clearly, the formal credit 
system does not cope with such households. 
In conclusion, this study supports with empirical- evidence.what has 
become increasingly recognized that efforts to reach small farmers with formal 
market credit programs need to concentrate not only on factors .that increase 
the productivity of credit, which has been the traditional approach through 
extension, marketing and infrastructural development programs, but also on 
innovations to reduce the costs of credit delivery for farm~r and lender alike. 
Once farmers borrow, it is expected they will tend to undertake more inves.t-
ment, use higher levels of technology and raise incomes. 
The supply side of a dual approach to agricultural credit program 
development should emphasize, in accordmce with the results of this study, 
two interrelated features to reduce the cost and availability of credit. First, 
farmers distant from the marketplace must be reached. Second, the transactions 
costs of borrowing !!lust be sigiificantly lowered. The first might be accom-
plished by increasing the availability of financial services in the rural areas. 
Examples are mobile banks, local savings and loan cooperatives, branch offices 
and new credit institutions. It would also require increased credit educational 
and promotional efforts in these areas. The second could be accomplished by 
means of simplified application procedures, group loans, cooperative loans 
and other cost-reducing innovations. •· I.n addition, lenders who understand the 
local language and cul tu re are essential• to make. the financial services avail-
able to all households. 
It is clear that if the gap between the Bolivian small farmers who have 
credit and who want credit is to be closed, then closer attention must be 
directed to factors that reduce credit costs and increase the accessibility 
16• 
of credit. This approach alongside with efforts to enhance the productivity 
of inputs employed with credit would enhance small-farmer borrowing utility 
and work towards development objectives in that country. Even though these 
results are country specific they are suggestive for policies in other 
countries. 
• 
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*The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Warren Lee, Leroy Husak, 
Dale Adams and others at Ohio State University. The research was supported 
by the United States agency for International Development. The authors alone 
are responsible for the contents of the paper. 
10n1y nineteen variables were used in the discriminate functions because 
three variables - literacy, off-farm income and net farm income - showed 
high degrees of multicollinarity with other variables. 
2The proportion of explained variation is obtained by squaring the canonical · 
correlation value of the discriminant function. 
I 
3The classification procedure was carried out using equal group priors. 
Classification of the same observations used to estimate the function may 
upward bias the pro?ortion correctly classified. 
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TABLE 1 : Group Means of Differentiating Characteristics Between 
Non-Potential Borro.,.·ers, Potential Borrowers and Present 
Borro~-ers, and Associated Univariate ,F-values 
Ho•Ji;_e~~ld Non- .Univariateb 
Cnarac:eristics a potential Potential Borrowers F-values 
Education 1.52 L69 2.18 7.10 *** 
Literacy 0.44 0.51 0.79 6.48 *** 
*** 
Lang~age 0.79 0.46 0.84 22.03 
*** Age 51.41 45.38 45.26 4.75 
*** Distance 2.20 2. 77 2.42 7.17 
Land 2.64 3.60 6.54 1.05 
*** Land Title 0.36 0.58 0.47 6.05 
c *** Of f-far::i Inco=e 4485.20 3180.46 8049.47 5.93 
(pesos) 
Net Far::! Incc=e c 1883 .. 79 3050.50 4377. 05 0.69 
(pesos) 
** 
~ .... 
• -1.. F.ot.:se~olC. 6368.98 6230.96 12426.52 3.54 
Inco=e (pesos) 
*** Cattle 4.26 3.16 6.89 8.59 
Percent Corn . 5.82 4.65. 8.74 1.16 
** Per.:e:i.t Potatoes 2.00 8.89 2.86 3.14 
*** 
Mkt. I::itegration 32.46 33.41 61. 31. 13.56 
*** c ··0pe--r-i~,.. Exp • 1761. 48 1459.31 16142. 71 16.63 
.:..C:.--'"'"·'6 
(pesos) 
c *** Invest Exp. 183.85 574.81 366'·· 74 25 .• 16 
{pesos) 
*** Ioprove~ Te.::h. o·.23 o. 32 0.66 11.15 
*** Prod1,!ctio~ Goals 0.26 o.oo 0.03 71.07 
*** 
Price Security 0 •. 21 0.08 0.34 17.18 
*** 
~r.,ts. c.:t::'.. Ser;ices 0.36 0.58 0.58 5.26 
.-
::. 
'~ ;c 
" 
';. .. 
TABLE 1 : Continued 
Ho:.!se~o}.cl Non- Univariateb C . . . a potential Potential Borrowers na racte :-is ti.cs. F-values 
*** Keed for 0.21 0.06 0.05 10.49 
!-fore h,:l!"~ers 
Need for 0.41 0.46 0.37 0.89 
Hore La:1.d 
N~. of O~serva~ions (70) (569) (47) 
aSee list of variables for definitions and units of measurements. 
bSuperscripts denote significance level of 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*), 
(2. a'1d 581 DF). 
c'Ihe ex:::'.:a::ge •;alue of the 3olivian Peso during the period of the study 
~es $:20.0Q = $1.00 U.S.). 
• 
< 
• 
.. 
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TABLE 2': Discrininant Analysis of Borrower Groups . 
Hous~:-io!.d 
Ch~r2·:teristics 
Educa:io:. 
Lang~age 
Age 
Dista"1.ce 
Land 
Land Title 
Net Eouse=::old Inco;;-ie 
Cattle 
Percent Co:-n 
Perce:-,t P::i:a~oes 
Mkt. Integ=a:ion 
Ope'!'::.:ir:; E:·:? • 
Inves:. E:-=?• 
Ir:iprc·:ed Tech. 
Produ;::ti~:i Goals 
Price. S:::c~rity 
Mk.ts. a::::. Sen·ices 
l~eed fc"!:' ~:o:-e \·~or~~e~s 
Need for ~·~c~e La:?d 
Standardized Discriminant 
Function Coefficients 
Function I Function 
.0.010 -0.085 
-0.227 -0.065 
-0.098 0.104 
0.118 -0.111. 
0.043 .0.226 
0.063 0.025 
0.036 0.032 
-0.119 -0.244 
--0.010 -0.021 
0.078 0.025 
-0.012 -0.159 
--0.006 -0.284 
-0.017 -0.519 
0.107 -0.237 
I 
-0.816 0.079 
-0.244 -0.378 
-0.006 -0.100 
-0.282 0.145 
-0.090 0.022 
II 
Table 2: (Continued) 
F.ous.::~old 
Chc::=acteristics 
Gro:.:p Ce::troids 
Non-potential 
Borro-..;ers 
·.Potential 
Borro:-:::rs 
Borrowers 
Eigem.-alue 
Relative Percentage 
Canonical Correl~tion 
Wil~:' s La:::bda 
~ , 
a;J. is sig:::if icant at 
1:');.2 is significant at 
0.001 
0.001 
Standardized Discrirninartt 
Function Coefficients 
Function I Function II 
-1.584 0.271 
0.221 0.088 
-0.282 -1.561 
0.446 0.209 
68.06 31.94 
0.555 0.416 
0.572 0.827 
319.6sa: 108.71h 
level (38 DF) 
level (18 DF) 
• 
• 
• •' ,,.,,, '§,-
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Table 3: Differences Between Formal and Informal Credit Market_ 
Borrowers 
Formal }1arket Borro~ers Have: 
· Higher Levels of 
Net household income 
Net farm income 
Off-farm income 
More cultivable land 
Education 
Closer proximity to market centers 
Different uses of credit for: 
Seed 
Fertilizers or chenicals 
Tools or machinery 
Larger loans 
More proficiency in Spanish 
(rather than Quechua) 
15.63*** 
10.17*** 
3.64 
3.57 
3.27 
18.26*** 
4.40** 
8.12*** 
3.13* 
17.54**** 
0.36 
Superscripts denote significance level of 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10/, (*). 
TABL:E: 4: Association of Credit Use Impediments with Farm-
Household Characteristics 
Age 
Education 
Language 
Distance from Har~et 
Useable land size 
"?;et Eousehold Inco::!e 
Stated Fear of Repa;-:-:ent as Im.pediment 
Education 
Distance from Narket 
Useable Land Size 
State:l Fear of Refusal as !;::pedi3cnt 
Language 
Distar:ce from Harket 
Useable land Size 
4.68* 
12.24*1:-1.: 
93.80**": 
50.83*.H: 
17.70*** 
23.03**>': 
10.24*** 
28. 711*** 
18.76*** 
42.92*** 
19.03*** 
10.30*** 
Superscripts denote significance lev~l of 1%("~**), 5%(*~':), and 10%(*) • 
• 
